Maybe just to give some thoughts (and answers still):
a) What I hope people would understand is the share dynamics. The pre tax result of Mandatum was 210 MEUR, of which “with profit” made around 160 MEUR. The with profit is in run-off and roughly in 2030 the balances should be halved. If one has a steady margin, the 160 MEUR should turn roughly to 80 MEUR in 2030 and if there is no growth or no improvement of margin in the remaining asset management business or unit-link insurance the pre tax results will be ca. 130 MEUR in 2030. If share price is directly relative to the results this would mean that in 2030 the Mandatum share should trade at 2,37 EUR (3,83 todays close*130/210 - this is naturally a simplification, would mean around 20c loss per share per year).
b) In terms of share price one would need as such growth in the asset management and unit-link business to cover this loss (and a steady margin).
When it comes to the margin, two key notes:
c) The point of noting out the low New Business CMS in Unit-Link (UL) is important that it also indicates that the margin might be shrinking (or is de facto) in this business - i.e. the value loss is higher. In terms of the whole industry; when UL was created many insurers realized that they can charge rather high fees from customers. In general these fees are grouped to alpha (admin and distribution fees), beta (asset management fees), gamma (account charges) and surrender fees. Additionally some of these fees might be upfronted. To give an idea of “early days” UL: a client signs a 1000 EUR a year regular premium policy for 15 years, alpha being 5%, beta 1% and gamma is 1%. In term of uprfronting the alpha of 15 years is levied in first 5 years (in able to pay higher commission to sales network) - and the surrender fee is 100% for the first five. Now, lot of these early contracts have deemed (for a reason!) to be unfair for the customer and regulatory authorities have set limits on all of these - what one sees quite often is that the relative result of a UL insurer is downward trending (relative to volume) over last years - i.e. the new contracts (more fair) are less profitable than the old ones. In these kind of cases one often sees similiar figures as in the case of Mandatum, low new business (CSM) high release (old contract lapses, CSM).
d) In terms of asset management I take for granted that Mandatums expansion to another countries is expensive; i.e. there are set-up costs, legal costs and client acquisition is more expensive than in home market.
e) In terms of Mandatum it is also notable that they do not have their own distribution network nor a captive bank. This usually leads to high distribution costs (banks know how to charge as they know the fees) and agents (like Alexandria) are often driven by the commission (see upfronting example) (i.e. don´t be suprised also if a broker like Alexandria offer you UL products from some offshore with more relaxed fee regulation…).
The point of above (f,d,e) is just to note that people should understand it is not only about the asset growth, it is also about the margin. If you look at the example in the beginning (with-profit) and combine it to the above, it is not only about the 160 MEUR that is under pressure it is also the 50 MEUR from Asset Management and UL. In this context it is worrying that the retail UL NBV is only 2,2 MEUR, basically this means (roughly) that in the contractual period (10 to 15 years?) only 2,2 MEUR is expected to be earned (mind discounting), significantly less than what was released. Is this an issue of the older contracts (industry specific) or not, one never knows, but can speculate.
When it comes to the background Sampo was trying silently sell Mandatum, but apparently there was only one bidder (rumor Storebrand), but price opinion was apparently rather big. Spinning off was as such the only remaining option.
Concerning large M&A the company has no experience. Covering the 80 MEUR WP hole would with a 10 p/e mean 800 MEUR in acquisitions by 2030, which seems very aggressive. Keeping in mind that asset managers have low net asset values, majority of such acquistions would mean goodwill, which under Solvency II is deducted from SII Own Funds (i.e. would be from shareholders perspective same as dividend) - point being that this would be risky to the dividend and capital returns.
The point of this whole is not to bash. Hopefully people just understand that 8% dividend is de facto from the result and from the return of capital (deriving from the WP run-off) and the shareprice as such (depending how much one believes in AuM growth and margin) should decrease for natural reasons (how much - well, let´s start from 20c per year?).
Is this a return one likes? Well, one can do worse (Betolar, Duell) and one can maybe get a better total return somewhere else too…
…anyway will warmly recommend to monitor New busines Value when time goes (<5% per annum asset growth is worthless if new margin is 0% or less, )